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ABSTRACT. The Simple Counterfactual Analysis (SCA) was once considered the most prom-
ising analysis of disposition ascriptions. According to SCA, disposition ascriptions are to be 
analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. In the last few decades, however, SCA has 
become the target of a battery of counterexamples. In all counterexamples, something seems 
to be interfering with a certain object’s having or not having a certain disposition thus mak-
ing the truth-values of the disposition ascription and its associated counterfactual come 
apart. Intuitively, however, it would seem that, if all interferences were absent, the disposi-
tion ascription and its associated conditional would have the same truth-value. Although this 
idea may seem obvious, it is far from obvious how to define the notion of ‘interference’ in a 
clear and non-circular manner. In fact, it is has become widely assumed that it is not possi-
ble to do so. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is wrong. I will develop an anal-
ysis of disposition ascriptions, the Interference-Free Counterfactual Analysis (IFCA), which 
relies on a clear and non-circular definition of the notion of interference and which avoids 
the standard counterexamples to SCA while vindicating the intuition that disposition ascrip-
tions and counterfactual conditionals are intimately related.  
 
1. Introduction 
We routinely ascribe dispositions to objects. We may say, for example, that the teacup is 
fragile, that the coach is short-tempered, or that silicon is a semiconductor. A philosophical 
account of disposition ascriptions would seem to include at least three components: first, a 
criterion for distinguishing dispositional predicates from non-dispositional ones; second, an 
analysis of covert disposition ascriptions (such as the ones in my initial examples) into overt-
ly dispositional terms (along the lines of ‘o is disposed to M when S’); third, an analysis of 
overt disposition ascriptions in non-dispositional terms. In this paper, I will be concerned 
exclusively with this third component. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, I will focus only 
on overt ascriptions of “sure-fire”, “single-track” dispositions and I will call ‘disposition as-
criptions’ both positive disposition ascriptions (e.g. ‘o is disposed to M when S’) and negative 
disposition ascriptions (e.g. ‘o is not disposed to M when S’), so that, in what follows, ‘dispo-
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sition’ will mean ‘sure-fire, single-track disposition’ and ‘disposition ascription’ will mean 
‘overt (positive or negative) ascription of a sure-fire, single-track disposition’. 
Once upon a time, the Simple Counterfactual Analysis (SCA) used to be considered the most 
promising analysis of disposition ascriptions. According to SCA, disposition ascriptions are 
to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals in accordance with the following 
schema: 
(SCA): o is disposed to M when S iff, if it were that S, then o would M. 
To the casual observer SCA may seem so obvious as not to be even worth spelling out. 
However, in the last few decades, SCA has been the target of a battery of counterexamples,1 
and, although a number of valiant attempts to defend it have been made,2 there seems to be 
a growing suspicion that SCA cannot be salvaged.3 In this paper, I will try to dispel this sus-
picion by developing and defending an analysis of disposition ascriptions, the Interference-Free 
Counterfactual Analysis (IFCA), which vindicates the intuitions that underlie SCA while avoid-
ing the standard counterexamples to it.4 In §2, I will briefly rehash the standard counterex-
amples to SCA. In §§3–5, I will outline the proposed analysis of disposition ascriptions for 
intrinsic dispositions (intIFCA) and define its central notion—i.e. that of interference. In §6, 
I will illustrate how intIFCA avoids the standard counterexamples. In §§7–10, I will discuss 
some seemingly problematic cases. Finally, in §11, I will offer an analysis of extrinsic disposi-
tion ascriptions (extIFCA) to complement intIFCA. 
2. The Standard Counterexamples 
The standard counterexamples to SCA are usually grouped into four categories, which are 
often labeled ‘finks’, ‘masks’, ‘antidotes’, and ‘mimicks’. Since I do not find this fourfold 
classification particularly illuminating, I will not spend too much time trying to give an ab-
stract characterization of each category or explain the differences among them. Instead I will 
limit myself to introducing one representative exemplar for each category of counterexam-
ple. 
Fink. This live copper wire is disposed to conduct electricity when touched by a conductor, 
but, since a circuit breaker is installed on the same circuit, if a conductor were to touch the 
wire, the circuit breaker would open the circuit and the wire would not conduct electricity. 
Mask. This porcelain vase is disposed to break when dropped. The vase, however, has been 
wrapped in bubble wrap so carefully that, if the vase were to be dropped, it would not 
break. 
                                                
1 See, e.g., (Johnston 1992) (Martin 1994), and (Bird 1998). 
2 See (Lewis 1997), (Malzkorn 2000), (Gundersen 2002), (Choi 2008), and (Steinberg 2010) to name just a 
few. Although the general consensus seems to be that none of these strategies is entirely satisfactory (see n.3 
below), it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess their merits and demerits. 
3 This suspicion is more or less explicitly expressed by, e.g., (Heil 2003), (Fara 2005), (Bird 2008), (Manley 
and Wasserman 2008), and (Martin 2008). 
4 I should note here that, in trying to vindicate SCA, I am not also trying to vindicate the disgraced counter-
factual account of dispositionality (CAD), which is widely regarded as having been refuted by Hugh Mellor 
(1974). According to CAD, a predicate is dispositional if and only if its ascription entails a counterfactual. Even 
if it may have seemed natural for someone who accepts SCA to also accept CAD and vice versa, the two ac-
counts are independent and do not stand or fall together. 
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Antidote. This potassium cyanide pill is disposed to kill when ingested. However, if Mithrida-
tes were to ingest the pill, he would not die because he has previously ingested some hy-
droxycobalamin, which is an antidote to potassium cyanide. 
Mimick. This sturdy golden chalice is not disposed to break when touched. However, a sor-
cerer has cast a spell on it that would cause the chalice to break into pieces if anything were 
to touch it.  
The first three scenarios, Fink, Mask, and Antidote, are counterexamples to the “if” side of 
SCA. In each of them, the analysandum—i.e. the disposition ascription—would seem to be 
true, but the analysans—i.e. the associated counterfactual—seems to come out false (the wire 
in Fink is live but would not conduct electricity if touched by a conductor, the vase in Mask 
is fragile but would not break if struck, and the pill in Antidote is poisonous but would not 
kill if ingested). The last scenario, Mimick, on the other hand, constitutes a counterexample 
to the “only if” side of SCA. In it, the analysandum would seem to be false but its associated 
counterfactual would seem to come out true (the chalice is not fragile but, nevertheless, it 
would break if it were to be touched). 
As far as I can see, the distinction between the counterexamples that target the “if” side 
of SCA on one side and those that target the “only if” side of SCA on the other is far more 
significant than the customary classification into finks, masks, antidotes, and mimicks. As I 
will argue, all standard counterexamples to the “if” side of SCA (including those that are 
usually classified as finks, masks, and antidotes) rely on what I will call ‘destructive interfer-
ences’ and can be dealt with in one fell swoop. It is only counterexamples to the “only if” 
side of SCA, which rely on what I will call ‘constructive interferences’, that require a some-
what different treatment. In the next few sections, I will substantiate my claims by defining 
the notions of destructive and constructive interferences (in §5) and showing how they can 
be used to defuse the standard counterexamples (in §6). Before doing so, however, in the 
next two sections, I will introduce and outline my general proposal. 
3. The Interference-Free Counterfactual Analysis 
The basic idea behind the IFCA, which I will develop and defend in the rest of this paper, is 
rather obvious—in all standard counterexamples to SCA, something interferes with what an 
object is (or is not) disposed to do and, as a result, the truth-values of the disposition ascrip-
tion and of its associated counterfactual come apart; if all interferences were to be removed, 
however, the disposition ascription and its associated conditional would have the same truth-
value, as predicted by SCA.  
The basic idea is not particularly original either. After all, IFCA would seem to be just one 
of the many attempts to avoid the standard counterexamples to SCA by prefixing the associ-
ated counterfactual with a qualifying clause (e.g.: ‘ceteris paribus’, ‘in normal/ideal circum-
stances’, etc.). In the case of IFCA, the qualifying clause would be something along the lines 
of ‘in the absence of any interferences’. 
If the basic idea is rather obvious (and not particularly original), however, what is far 
from obvious is how to implement it successfully. In fact, it has become widely assumed that 
it is not possible to do so.5 On the one hand, specifying all possible interferences one by one 
would seem to be impossible (for any given object, there would seem to be infinitely many 
possible ways to interfere with what it is (or what it is not) disposed to do); on the other 
                                                
5 See n.3. 
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hand, simply prefixing the associated counterfactual with the generic qualifying clause ‘in the 
absence of any interferences’ might not seem to be an adequate solution, for, unless the no-
tion of ‘interference’ can defined clearly and without circularity, such clause would seem to 
be open to charges of vacuity.6 
Supporters of qualified counterfactual accounts have usually tried to address this sort of 
challenge by arguing that the content of qualifying clauses need not be explicitly specifiable 
for those clauses not to be vacuous.7 Unfortunately, however, this approach does not seem 
to entirely dispel the suspicion of vacuity. In this paper, I will take (and more ambitious) 
tack—I will argue that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, it is in fact possible to meet the chal-
lenge and give a clear and non-circular definition of the notion of interference. In the next 
section (§4), I will introduce my proposal in its bare bones and then, in the following section 
(§5), I will flesh it out by defining the two central notions it employs—i.e. those of construc-
tive and destructive interferences. If my arguments are sound, the indefinability of qualifying 
clauses turns out to be a philosophical myth and qualified counterfactual accounts of dispo-
sition ascriptions can be definitively cleared of the charge of vacuity. 
4. Intrinsic Disposition Ascriptions 
According to the Interference-Free Counterfactual Analysis of intrinsic disposition ascriptions (in-
tIFCA), intrinsic disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed as follows: 
(intIFCA): o is intrinsically disposed to M when S iff: 
(1) : 
(1.1) it is nomically possible that S,8 
(1.2) if it were that S, then o would M,  
and 
(1.3) nothing interferes with o’s not being intrinsically disposed to M when S, 
or 
(2) something interferes with o’s being intrinsically disposed to M when S. 
Let me call a destructive interference anything that interferes with an object’s being intrinsical-
ly disposed to M when S and a constructive interference anything that interferes with an object’s 
not being intrinsically disposed to M when S. According to intIFCA, an (intrinsic) disposition 
ascription can still be true of an object even if its associated counterfactual is false as long as 
something is destructively interfering with the object’s having the disposition in question and 
it can still be false even if its associated counterfactual is true insofar as something is con-
structively interfering with the object’s not having the disposition in question. 
Now, the problem, of course, is that, as it stands, intIFCA is patently circular, for the very 
notion that needs to be analyzed (i.e. that of being intrinsically disposed to M when S) occurs 
in the analysans. In order to avoid charges of circularity, therefore, intIFCA needs to be sup-
                                                
6 Willard van Orman Quine, for one, wrote ‘An infirmity of the dispositional idiom […] is its dependence 
on a vague proviso of caeteris paribus’ (Quine 1973: 12; cited in (Molnar 2003: 88)). 
7 See, e.g., the aforementioned (Steinberg 2010). 
8 Although this clause is not required to deal with the standard counterexamples to SCA, I think it is needed 
to avoid other potential counterexamples. In particular, it ensures that the associated counterfactual (in-
tIFCA(1.2)) is not a counternomic. For those who believe laws of nature to be contingent, this reflects the 
common assumption that an object’s dispositions are the ones it has under the actual laws of nature. For those 
who (like me) take laws of nature to be necessary, this is to ensure that the associated counterfactual is not a 
counterpossible and, hence, merely vacuously true. 
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plemented with a definition of the notions of destructive interference and constructive inter-
ference that do not themselves employ notions that are either explicitly or implicitly disposi-
tional. It is to this task that I turn to in the next section. 
Before doing so, however, let me emphasize that intIFCA only provides us with an analy-
sis of ascriptions of intrinsic dispositions—i.e. dispositions that cannot be acquired or lost 
without undergoing some intrinsic change9—(hence the ‘int’ in ‘intIFCA’). This is because 
the distinction between extrinsic dispositions and cases of mimicking is too fine a distinction 
to draw at this level of analysis. It is only in §11 below that, with an adequate analysis of in-
trinsic disposition ascriptions in hand, I will be able to offer an analysis of extrinsic disposi-
tion ascriptions to complement intIFCA. Until then, I will focus exclusively on intrinsic dis-
positions and, unless otherwise stated, by ‘disposition’ I will mean ‘intrinsic disposition’. 
5. Destructive and Constructive Interferences 
In this section, I will provide the definitions of the notions of destructive interference and 
constructive interference. Since these definitions are somewhat convoluted, however, I will 
first introduce both notions informally.  Let me start with the notion of destructive interference. 
Something destructively interferes with o’s being intrinsically disposed to M when S if and 
only if it participates in at least one of possibly many actual but nomically contingent states 
of affairs such that, even if only one of these states of affairs were to obtain, o would not M 
if it were the case that S, but, if none of those states of affairs obtained (and o and its parts 
did not acquire any intrinsic property10 in the process), then, if it were the case that S, o 
would M. So, for example, the bubble wrap in Mask destructively interferes with the vase’s 
being intrinsically disposed to break when dropped because the bubble wrap participates in 
an actual but nomically contingent state of affairs (i.e. the bubble wrap’s being wrapped around the 
vase) such that, insofar as that state of affairs obtains, the vase would not break if dropped 
but, if that state of affairs did not to obtain (and the vase and its parts did not acquire any 
intrinsic properties as a result), then the vase would break if it were to be dropped.11 
Let me now turn to the notion of constructive interference. Something constructively inter-
feres with an object’s not being intrinsically disposed to M when S if and only if it participates 
in at least one of possible many actual but nomically contingent states of affairs such that, 
even if only one of those states of affairs obtains, then, if it were the case that S, o would M, 
but, if none of those states of affairs obtained (and o and its parts did not lose any intrinsic 
property in the process), then, if it were the case that S, o would not M. So, for example, the 
sorcerer in Mimick constructively interferes with the chalice’s not being intrinsically disposed 
to break when touched because it participates in an actual but nomically contingent state of 
affairs (i.e. the sorcerer’s having cast a spell on the chalice) such that, whenever that state of affairs 
obtains, the chalice would break if it were to be touched but, if that state of affairs did not 
                                                
9 The disposition a key has to unlock a certain lock, for example, is an intrinsic disposition of that key, for 
the key cannot acquire it or lose it without undergoing any intrinsic change (e.g. by becoming bent). The key’s 
disposition to open a certain door, on the other hand, is extrinsic, for the key can lose it without undergoing 
any intrinsic change (e.g. the key can lose it if the door lock gets replaced). 
10 Although the notion of intrinsic property is notoriously difficult to define (see, e.g., (Lewis 1983), (Hum-
berstone 1999)), here I will assume that, as Stephen Yablo once put it, ‘you know what an intrinsic property is: 
it’s a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself’ (1999: 479). 
11 Note that here I will not distinguish between something interfering with a disposition and something in-
terfering with its manifestation. In the terminology used here, to interfere with the manifestation of a disposi-
tion is just one way to interfere with that disposition. 
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obtain (and the chalice and its proper parts did not lose any intrinsic property), the chalice 
would not break if it were to be touched. 
Now for the more formal definitions. The predicates ‘x (destructively) interferes with o’s 
being intrinsically disposed to M when S’ and ‘x (constructively) interferes with o’s not being 
intrinsically disposed to M when S’ are defined as follows: 
(DI): x (destructively) interferes with o’s being intrinsically disposed to M when S iff: 
(1) I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and In (where ‘x’ occurs free at least once in ‘I1 and … 
and Ik(x) and … and In’), 
(2) it is nomically possible that not-(I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and In), 
(3) it is not the case that, if it were the case that S, then o would M, 
(4) for each Ij (1≤j≤n), even if it were the case that not-(I1 and … and I(j–1) and I(j+1)  
and … and In), it would still not be the case that, if it were that S, then o would 
M, 
(5) if it were the case that not-(I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and In), then: 
(5.1) it would be the case that, if it were that S, then o would M, and 
(5.2) it would not be the case that, if it were that not-S, then o would M,  
(6) it is not the case that, if it were the case that not-(I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and 
In), then some (proper or improper) part of o, o*, would acquire some (sparse, 
natural) intrinsic property, (where by ‘property’, throughout this paper, I will 
mean exclusively ‘sparse, natural property’, so that, for example, neither ‘not being 
made of gold’ nor ‘being 3 meters long or such that 2+2=4’ denote a property), 
(CI) x (constructively) interferes with o’s not being intrinsically disposed to M when S iff: 
(1) I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and In, 
(2) it is nomically possible that not-(I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and In), 
(3) if it were the case that S, o would M, 
(4) for each Ij (1≤j≤n), even if it were case that not-(I1 and … and I(j–1) and I(j+1) and 
… and In), it would still be the case that, if it were that S, then o would M, 
(5) if it were the case that not-(I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and In), then it would not 
be the case that, if it were that S, then o would M, and 
(6) it is not the case that, if it were the case that not-(I1 and … and Ik(x) and … and 
In), then some (proper or improper) part of o, o*, would lose some intrinsic 
property, 
 
I will now offer a brief, informal explanation of each clause of DI and CI and, where ap-
propriate, of the rationale for it. DI(1) and CI(1) require that interferences are states of af-
fairs that actually obtain. DI(1) and CI(1) allow for there to be only one interference as well 
as multiple ones. 
DI(2) and CI(2) require that interferences are nomically contingent states of affairs. These 
clauses are meant to ensure that all interferences can be removed without breaking any laws 
of nature. These clauses are meant to avoid that, for example, this copper wire turns out to 
be an electrical insulator whose disposition not to conduct electricity is interfered with by the 
fact that (as a matter of nomic necessity) electrons repel each other. For those who, like me, 
believe laws of nature to be necessary, these conditions are also meant to exclude that the 
counterfactuals in DI(5)and CI(5) are counternomics and, as such, vacuously true (thus 
avoiding that, for example, my bike turns out to be disposed to turn into a unicorn when 
travelling faster than light). 
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DI(3) and CI(3) require that the associated counterfactuals are, respectively, actually false 
and actually true. Unless multiple interferences obtain, then, under some widely held as-
sumptions about the semantics of counterfactuals,12 these conditions are made redundant by 
DI(4) and CI(4). 
DI(4) and CI(4) are there to ensure that each interference is individually sufficient for the 
associated counterfactuals to be, respectively, false and true. Otherwise, insofar as, for ex-
ample, the vase in Mask is wrapped in bubble wrap, anything would seem to destructively 
interfere with its disposition to break when dropped, for, as it is easy to verify, the Eiffel Tow-
er’s being 1,063 ft tall, Socrates’ being snubnosed or what-have-you meet all other conditions for 
being destructive interferences. 
DI(5) and CI(5) demand that, if none of the interferences obtained, the associated coun-
terfactuals would be, respectively, true and false, as predicted by SCA. DI(5) also requires 
that, if all interferences were absent, the consequent of the associated counterfactual would 
not be true even if its antecedent were false. This is supposed to guarantee that the stimulus 
condition plays a role in bringing about the manifestation of the disposition. If this wasn’t 
the case, this chair’s not being hit with a sledgehammer, for example, would turn out to interfere 
with an alleged disposition the chair would have to break when looked at. 
Finally, DI(6) is meant to ensure that the object does not acquire any dispositions it does 
not actually have by virtue of acquiring some intrinsic property that would act as the causal 
bases for those dispositions and CI(6) that the object does not lose any dispositions it actual-
ly has by virtue of losing some intrinsic property that would act as the causal basis for those 
dispositions. This wire’s not being made of rice flour, for example, does not interfere destructively 
with its disposition to taste good in a stir-fry nor does its being made of copper constructively 
interfere with its not being disposed to conduct electricity, for, needless to say, the wire is nei-
ther disposed to taste good in a stir-fry nor not disposed to conduct electricity. 
Now, since DI and CI provide us with a clear and non-circular definition of the notions 
of destructive and constructive interferences, it should be clear that intIFCA is immune to 
charges of vacuity. In the next section, I will explain why it is fit for the job by explaining 
how it avoids the standard counterexamples to SCA. 
6. The Standard Counterexamples Defused 
Consider first the counterexamples to the “if” side of SCA—such as finks, masks, and anti-
dotes. In these counterexamples, the analysandum (i.e. the disposition ascription) was true, but 
the analysans (i.e. the associated counterfactual) came out false. On intIFCA, however, these 
scenarios pose no challenge, for, even if the associated counterfactual is false, the analysans 
still comes out true. This is because finks, masks, antidotes, and the likes are destructive in-
terferences and, therefore, even if the first disjunct of the analysans is false (because the asso-
ciated counterfactual (intIFCA(1.2)) is false), the analysans is still true because its second dis-
junct (intIFCA(2)—i.e. ‘Something destructively interferes with o’s being disposed to M 
when S’) is true. 
                                                
12 The assumption in question is what is sometimes called ‘strong centering’—i.e. the assumption that no 
possible world is as close to the actual world as the actual world itself. 
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Let me illustrate this by focusing on Fink. According to (DI), the circuit breaker in Fink 
(destructively) interferes with the wire’s being intrinsically disposed to conduct electricity 
when touched by a conductor,13 as all of the following conditions hold. 
 
(1) The circuit breaker is installed on the circuit. 
(2) It is nomically possible for the circuit breaker not to be installed. 
(3) It is not the case that, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, it would 
not conduct electricity. 
(4) [This condition is redundant in this case because only one interference obtains.] 
(5) If the circuit breaker was not installed, then: 
(5.1) if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity, 
and 
(5.2) it would not be the case that, if the wire were not to be touched by a con-
ductor, then it would conduct electricity. 
(6) If the circuit breaker was not installed, neither the wire nor any of its proper 
parts would acquire any intrinsic property. 
 
If, instead of only one circuit breaker, there were multiple circuit breakers installed on the 
circuit, then each of them would count as a destructive interference according to DI. Let me 
illustrate this with the case in which two circuit breakers (call them ‘CB#1’ and ‘CB#2’) are 
installed on the circuit. It is easy to see that all of the following conditions would hold. 
 
(1) Both CB#1 and CB#2 are installed. 
(2) It is nomically possible that neither CB#1 nor CB#2 is installed. 
(3) It is not the case that, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, then it 
would conduct electricity. 
(4) : 
(4.1) Even if CB#1 were not installed, it would still not be the case that, if the 
wire were to be touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity (this is, ob-
viously, because CB#2 would still be installed) and,  
(4.2) even if CB#2 were not installed, it would still not be the case that, if the 
wire were to be touched by a conductor, then it would conduct electricity (be-
cause CB#1 would still be installed). 
(5) If neither CB#1 nor CB#2 were installed, then: 
(5.1) if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity, 
and 
(5.2) it would not be the case that, if the wire were not to be touched by a con-
ductor, then it would conduct electricity, and 
(6) If neither CB#1 nor CB#2 were installed, then neither the wire nor any of its 
proper parts would acquire any intrinsic property. 
 
                                                
13 Here I am following a short but venerable philosophical tradition in assuming that being live is an intrin-
sic disposition of the wire (see, e.g., (Lewis 1997)). However, I should note that this assumption seems to be 
mistaken. Unlike the wire’s being a good conductor, its being live would not seem to be an intrinsic disposition 
of the wire. A wire is live only if it is (directly or indirectly) connected to the two terminals of a voltage source 
(such as a battery or a socket) and, therefore, can lose that disposition without undergoing any intrinsic change. 
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Since what I have said about Fink applies, mutatis mutandis, to Mask and Antidote (as well as 
to all other cases of finks, masks, and antidotes), I leave it to the reader to verify that the 
bubble-wrap in Mask and the antidote in Antidote would also be classified as destructive in-
terferences by DI. 
I will now turn to counterexamples to the “only if” side of SCA. In these counterexam-
ples, the analysandum (i.e. the disposition ascription) is false and the analysans (i.e. the associat-
ed counterfactual) true. On intIFCA, however, even if the associated counterfactual is true, 
the analysans is still false because cases of mimicking are cases in which constructive interfer-
ences are at work and, therefore, both disjuncts of the analysans are false (for neither in-
tIFCA(1.3) (i.e. ‘Nothing destructively interferes with o’s not being disposed to M when S’) 
nor intIFCA(2) are satisfied). 
Consider, for example Mimick. According to CI, the sorcerer (constructively) interferes 
with the chalice’s not being disposed to break when touched because all of the following 
conditions obtain. 
 
(1) The sorcerer has cast a spell on the chalice. 
(2) It is nomically possible for the sorcerer not to have cast a spell on the chalice. 
(3) If the chalice were to be touched, it would break. 
(4) [This condition is redundant in this case because only one interference obtains.] 
(5) If the sorcerer had not cast a spell on the chalice, then it would not be the case 
that, if the chalice were to be touched, it would break. 
(6) If the sorcerer had not cast a spell on the chalice, then neither the chalice nor 
any of its proper parts would have lost any of its intrinsic properties. 
 
intIFCA seems thus able to avoid the standard counterexamples to SCA. However, there 
are other cases that may still appear to be problematic for intIFCA. In the following sec-
tions, I will discuss how intIFCA handles them. 
7. Possible Interferences 
One possible worry with intIFCA is that it focuses only on actual interferences as opposed 
to possible ones. But what if, once all actual interferences were removed, some other possi-
ble but non-actual interferences were to emerge as a result? In particular, one may be wor-
ried of a possible counterexample to intIFCA that fits the following pattern: 
 
i. o is intrinsically disposed to M when S. 
ii. not-J, 
iii. if it were that not-(I1 and …  and In), it would be that J. 
iv. if it were that J (and not-(I1 and …  and In)), it would not be the case that, if it were 
that S, o would M. 
 
Do any genuine counterexamples fit this pattern? At first, it is tempting to think so. Con-
sider, for example, the following variation on Fink. 
Possible Fink. This electric wire is live. However, Mr. Safe has installed a circuit breaker (call it 
‘CB#1’) onto the circuit, so, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, the circuit 
breaker would open the circuit and the wire would not conduct electricity. If, for any reason, 
the circuit breaker were to break or become disconnected from the circuit, however, Mr. 
Safe would immediately install a new (functional) circuit breaker (call it CB#2) on the cir-
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cuit, so that, once again, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, the circuit would 
open and the wire would not conduct electricity. 
Now, at first Possible Fink may appear to be a counterexample that meets all of the above 
conditions and, in particular, that CB#2’s being installed on the circuit is our non-actual destruc-
tive interference, J, while CB#1’s being installed on the circuit is the only actual destructive inter-
ference. A little reflection, however, shows that this is not the case. As it can be easily veri-
fied, in Possible Fink, there is another actual destructive interference at work—namely, Mr. 
Safe himself—for all of the following conditions apply. 
 
(1) CB#1 is installed and Mr. Safe is disposed to install a new circuit breaker when 
CB#1 fails.14 
(2) It is nomically possible for CB#1 not to be installed and for Mr. Safe not to be 
disposed to install a new circuit breaker. 
(3) It is not the case that, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, then it 
would conduct electricity. 
(4) : 
(4.1) Even if CB#1 was not installed, it would still not be the case that, if the 
wire were to be touched by a conductor, then it would conduct electricity, and,  
(4.2) even if Mr. Safe was not disposed to install a new circuit breaker, it would 
still not be the case that, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, then it 
would conduct electricity. 
(5) If it were not the case that CB#1 is installed and Mr. Safe is disposed to install a 
new circuit breaker, then: 
(5.1) if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity, 
and 
(5.2) it would not be the case that, if the wire were not to be touched by a con-
ductor, then it would conduct electricity, and 
(6) If CB#1 was not installed and Mr. Safe was not disposed to install a new circuit 
breaker, neither the wire nor any of its proper parts would acquire any intrinsic 
property. 
 
In general, in addition to conditions (i)–(iv), a counterexample based on possible interfer-
ences would have to satisfy a further condition: 
 
v. There is no x such that: 
v.a. K(x),  
v.b. it is nomically possible that not-K(x), 
v.c. if it were that not-(K(x) and I1 and … and In), it would not be the case that 
J. 
 
Any alleged counterexample that does not satisfy (v) would be defused by the fact that what-
ever would be responsible for bringing about the possible interference (i.e. K) would itself be 
classified as an actual interference by DI. 
                                                
14 Let me note that appealing to Mr. Safe’s disposition to install a new circuit breaker does not lead to circu-
larity here because we are not trying to determine what, if anything, interferes with that disposition but, rather, 
what interferes with the wire’s disposition to conduct electricity when touched by a conductor. 
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As far as I can see, there are no clear counterexamples to intIFCA that satisfy conditions 
(i)-(v), for the only cases in which (i)-(v) would be obviously jointly satisfied are cases in 
which it is not (logically, metaphysically, or nomically) possible that not-(I1 and I2 and … and 
In and J), so that, if it were the case that not-(I1 and I2 and … and In), it would have to be the 
case that J. In other words, the obtaining of the non-actual interference would have to be a 
direct result of the non-obtaining of the actual interferences not an indirect one as in Possible 
Fink. Personally, I cannot think of any clear counterexample to intIFCA that satisfy (i)-(v) 
and, while it might be just due to lack of imagination on my part, I suspect there is none. 
However, even if there were any clear counterexamples of this kind, they would seem to in-
volve cases in which an object has a disposition that is necessarily interfered with and these 
may be dealt with as I suggest in the next section, where I discuss necessary interferences. 
8. Necessary Interferences 
Consider now the following scenario: 
Necessary Mask. God (who is a necessary and omnipotent being) necessarily loves this ex-
tremely fragile vase so much that, if something were to strike the vase, God would miracu-
lously prevent the vase from breaking.15 
The first problem that scenarios such as Necessary Mask may seem to pose is that DI(2) 
(which requires the removal of the interference to be nomically possible) may not seem to be 
satisfied by God’s loving the vase, for, according to the story, it is necessary that God loves the 
vase and therefore it would seem that, a fortiori, it is nomically necessary that God does so. 
This problem, I think, can be solved by adopting a weak reading of DI(2) (and CI(2)), ac-
cording to which all DI(2) (and CI(2)) require(s) is that no laws of nature are broken in the 
process of removing the interference (which in this case is God’s love for the vase). On this 
weak reading, DI(2) would read ‘for all p, if it is a law of nature that p, then it is not the case 
that, if it were that not-(I1 and …  and In), then it would not be the case that p’). It seems 
plausible to claim that God would not break any law of nature by not loving the vase (as, 
presumably, it is not a consequence of the laws of nature that God loves the vase, as, I imag-
ine, God’s inclinations would not fall under their jurisdiction). On this weaker reading of 
DI(2), God’s love for the vase would therefore satisfy DI(2). 
Necessary Mask however may seem to raise a second problem, which is both subtler and 
more serious. Since God loves the vase necessarily, all counterfactuals whose antecedents 
involve God’s not loving the vase (including the two counterfactuals embedded in DI(5)) are 
counterpossibles and, as such, they are vacuously true. At first, this may not seem to be a 
problem—after all, one may think that all that matters is that DI(5) comes true even if only 
vacuously so. The problem, however, is that, if all it took to satisfy DI(5) were trivially true 
counterfactuals, then the vase could be ascribed all sorts of dispositions that, in fact, it does 
not have. As it can be easily verified, God’s love of the vase would also seem to destructively 
interfere with, for example, the disposition the vase would seem to have to turn into a but-
terfly when dropped. 
A possible reaction to this counterexample would be to dismiss it as too far-fetched. One 
could simply claim that a scenario needs to be genuinely possible in order for it to constitute 
a genuine counterexample and that, in order for the situation described by Necessary Mask to 
count as a counterexample, we would have to be persuaded that it could possibly obtain and, 
                                                
15 That is—it is necessary that, if the vase exists, God loves it. 
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since this would involve convincing us that there are good reason to believe not only that 
God exists and that She does so necessarily but also that She would bother turning vases in-
to butterflies for no apparent reason other than making troubles for intIFCA, this would 
seem to be a difficult task indeed. 
However, if a scenario needs not to be genuinely possible in order to constitute a coun-
terexample16 but only needs to be (prima facie) conceivable, then the burden of proof is not as 
heavy as the above reply assumes. So, for example, suppose that, necessarily, God does not 
exist and that, therefore, the scenario described by Necessary Mask cannot possibly obtain. 
The scenario described by Necessary Mask, however, would seem to be at least (prima facie) 
conceivable and this is all it takes for us to realize that, if it did obtain, it would cause trouble 
for intIFCA. 
Note, however, that this concession cuts both ways. If Necessary Mask can count as a 
counterexample to intIFCA despite its not describing a genuinely possible scenario, it is be-
cause we are able to see that certain counterpossibles are non-vacuously17 true (e.g. ‘If the sce-
nario described by Necessary Mask obtained, the vase would not break when struck despite its 
being very fragile’). If we are able to evaluate those counterpossibles, however, we would 
also seem to be able to evaluate counterpossibles such as ‘If God did not love the vase, the 
vase would break if it were to be struck’ and ‘If God did not love the vase, the vase would 
not turn into a butterfly if it were to be dropped’ as respectively (non-vacuously) true and 
false and this is all we need to defuse the kind of worry raised by necessary interferences. 
9. Intrinsic Interferences 
Consider now another case that might appear problematic (which I adapted from (Clarke 
2008)).18 
Intrinsic Fink. The Great Antonio is able to lift very heavy objects. However, he has recently 
developed a rare (intrinsic) hypersensitivity to heavy objects, so that whenever his bare 
hands come into contact with a heavy object his muscles lose their tone and, as a result, An-
tonio cannot lift the object. Whenever he wears gloves, however, the Great Antonio is still 
able to lift heavy objects. 
In Intrinsic Fink, the Great Antonio’s hypersensitivity to heavy objects would seem to inter-
fere with his ability to lift very heavy objects not destroy it. Antonio would still seem to have 
the ability to lift heavy objects when he is not touching one or when he is wearing gloves 
and, clearly, wearing gloves is not what makes Antonio strong—wearing gloves just masks 
his hypersensitivity. What is peculiar about this case is that the Great Antonio’s ability to lift 
heavy objects seems to be interfered by one of Antonio’s own intrinsic properties rather 
than by something extrinsic to Antonio and, no matter how unrealistic Intrinsic Fink may 
seem, we have no reason to assume there are no realistic scenarios in which an intrinsic 
property of an object destructively interferes with one of the object’s dispositions. So, in this 
case, the destructive interference would seem to be The Great Antonio’s being hypersensitive to 
heavy objects. This, however, would not seem to be a problem for intIFCA, for DI(6) only re-
quires that the object does not acquire any intrinsic property as a result of the removal of de-
                                                
16 Or, at least, those described by counterexamples to a philosophical analysis of some ordinary concept. 
17 If vacuous truth were all it takes, then any impossible scenario would be a counterexample to anything. 
18 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for persuading me to take intrinsic interfer-
ences more seriously. 
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structive interferences; it does not require that the object doesn’t lose some of its intrinsic 
properties (as CI(6) does). Now, since the Great Antonio would not seem to have to acquire 
any property if he were to lose his hypersensitivity to heavy objects (recall that in this paper, 
‘property’ means ‘sparse, natural property’, so that, e.g., not being hypersensitive to heavy objects 
does not classify as an intrinsic property), intIFCA would therefore seem to be able to han-
dle intrinsic interferences as well as it handles extrinsic ones. 
10. Extrinsic Interferences 
The last worry I would like to discuss is, I think, one of the most serious. The worry is that, 
on intIFCA, things would not seem to have many of the dispositions we ordinarily take 
them to have. Take, for example, this brand new, dry match. The match is such that, if it 
were to be struck, it would light and, ordinarily, we would take it to be disposed to light 
when struck. However, according to intIFCA, something—i.e. the presence of oxygen—
would seem to be constructively interfering with the match not being intrinsically disposed to 
light when struck, for, if there was no oxygen, the match would not light when struck. So, 
what has gone wrong? 
I think the correct answer is ‘Nothing’. The verdict delivered by intIFCA in this case is 
correct because the match is not intrinsically disposed to light when struck. It is only extrinsi-
cally disposed to do so. Its disposition to light when struck is one that the match may acquire 
or lose without undergoing any intrinsic change (only in virtue of changes in its environ-
ment), which is the hallmark of an extrinsic disposition.19 
As plausible as this reply may seem, however, it may not seem completely satisfactory un-
til intIFCA is supplemented with an analysis of extrinsic disposition ascriptions. It is to this 
task that I turn to in the next section. 
11. Extrinsic Disposition Ascriptions 
In this section, I will offer an analysis of extrinsic disposition ascriptions, extIFCA, to com-
plement intIFCA.20 As I mentioned, the main problem is how to draw a principled distinc-
tion between genuine extrinsic dispositions and mere cases of mimicking. Consider, for ex-
ample, two keys, Key and Key*. Key is so shaped that, if it were inserted in the lock on a 
certain door (let me call the lock ‘Lock’ and the door ‘Door’) and turned, it would cause the 
pins in Lock to rise in such a way that Lock would unlock and Door would be free to open. 
If Key* were inserted in Lock, on the other hand, its shape would not cause its pins to rise 
so as to unlock Lock. However, it just so happens that, if Key* were to be inserted in Lock, 
the Lock Fairy would magically cause the pins in Lock to rise so that Lock would unlock and 
Door would open. Now, the difference between Key and Key* would seem to be that, while 
Key is (extrinsically) disposed to open Door, Key* is not (its seeming disposition to open 
Door is, in fact, only a case of mimicking). The problem with intIFCA, however, is that it 
does not seem to be able to distinguish between these two cases, for, according to intIFCA, 
                                                
19 Moreover, to think otherwise would amount to holding the implausible view that the match is intrinsical-
ly disposed to light when struck but its disposition to light when struck is masked in the absence of oxygen. 
Personally, I am inclined to think that the absence of something cannot mask a disposition, but my reasons for 
thinking so depend on issues in the metaphysics of causation that fall far beyond the scope of this paper. 
20 Since this is not the place to make a case for extrinsic dispositions (see (McKitrick 2003) for one), I will 
just assume that some dispositions are extrinsic. Those who do not believe that there are any extrinsic disposi-
tions are free to reject this part of the account. 
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in both cases, something (i.e. Lock21 in the case of Key, the Lock Fairy in the case of Key*) 
is constructively interfering with the key’s not being intrinsically disposed to open Door. So, 
what, if anything, distinguishes these two cases? And, more in general, what distinguishes 
extrinsic dispositions from mere cases of mimicking?  
The answer, I think, is that, unlike mimicks, extrinsic dispositions are always underpinned 
by some intrinsic disposition of the object or of some of its proper parts. This conjecture 
gives rise to the following analysis of extrinsic disposition ascriptions: 
(extIFCA) : o is extrinsically disposed to M when S iff: 
(1) something interferes with o’s not being intrinsically disposed to M when S, 
(2) some (proper or improper) part of o, o*, is intrinsically disposed to M* when S* 
(for some M* and S*, which may or may not be identical with M or S), 
(3) if it were that S but o* did not M*, then o would not M,22 
and 
(4) if o* was not intrinsically disposed to M* when S*, then it would not be the case 
that, if it were that S, then o would M. 
 
extIFCA seems to deliver the right verdict in the case of Key and Key*. Although neither 
Key nor Key* are intrinsically disposed to open Door, Key is intrinsically disposed to open 
locks with Lock’s design. If Key were to lose that disposition (e.g. by becoming bent), it 
would also lose its disposition to open Door. In the case of Key*, on the other hand, there is 
no intrinsic disposition of Key* (or of any of its proper parts) to underpin its apparent dis-
position to open Door and this is thus a mere case of mimicking. 
extIFCA also seems to reach the right verdict in the other cases I have considered. For 
example, the one in Mimick would seem to be a case of mimicking because no intrinsic dis-
position of the chalice seems to underlie its supposed disposition to break when touched. (In 
fact, the chalice would seem to have an intrinsic23 disposition not to break when touched.24) 
The match discussed in the previous section, on the other hand, would seem to have an ex-
trinsic disposition to light when struck because the red phosphorus on its head is intrinsically 
disposed to turn into white phosphorus and heat up if struck on the side of a box—a dispo-
sition that the head of the match retains even when, due to the lack of oxygen, the match 
does not end up lighting up. 
                                                
21 Lock would count as a constructive interference because, if, for instance, Lock were to be replaced with a 
different lock, Key would no longer open Door if inserted in its lock and turned. 
22 extIFCA(3) is meant to ensure that the underlying intrinsic disposition would contribute to the manifesta-
tion of the extrinsic disposition it underlies. This is needed to avoid counterexamples such as the following 
variation on Mimick. A sorcerer has cast a spell that makes all and only (intrinsically) fragile things turn into 
butterflies when struck. This porcelain teacup is fragile and, due to the spell, it would therefore turn into a but-
terfly if it were to be struck. If the teacup were not fragile, on the other hand, the spell would not apply to it (as 
the spell applies only to fragile things). However, this would not seem to make the teacup extrinsically disposed 
to turn into a butterfly when struck. Since the fragility of the teacup does not meet conditions extIFCA(3) (as, 
for example, even if the teacup fragility were to be masked, the teacup would still turn into a butterfly if struck), 
however, the teacup does not turn out to be extrinsically disposed to turn into a butterfly when struck on ex-
tIFCA, as its fragility would not be manifested in the process of turning into a butterfly. 
23 Although, its intrinsicness may be a matter of contention, I will not discuss this here. 
24 One may suspect that similar results may be obtained by focusing on intrinsic properties rather than in-
trinsic dispositions. Although I sympathize with this view, I think it would be subject to certain kind of coun-
terexamples. For example, the sorcerer may have cast a spell on the chalice because the chalice is made of gold 
and the sorcerer hates all things that are made of gold. So, if the chalice were not made of gold, the sorcerer 
would not have cast a spell on it. 
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12. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have developed and defended an analysis of disposition ascriptions that vin-
dicates the intuition that there is a connection between disposition ascriptions and counter-
factual conditionals while avoiding the counterexamples that plagued SCA. The basic idea is 
that, in all standard counterexamples to SCA, something interferes with the object’s having 
or not having a certain disposition and that the associated counterfactual should only be 
evaluated after all interferences are (counterfactually) removed. Although this basic idea is 
rather obvious, conventional philosophical wisdom would have us believe that notions such 
as that of ‘interference’ cannot be defined in a clear and non-circular manner. In this paper, I 
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